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Abstract: The economic modernization of the Amazon fostered by the Brazilian 
military government during the 1960s and 1970s was largely realized without 
taking into consideration the presence of local households which lived from 
the extraction of forest products (mainly non-timber). When they began to be 
expulsed, a political resistance, often guided by the Catholic Church, appeared 
as well as the creation of unions based on traditional identities, especially that 
of rubber tappers. During the 1980s, these unions made a strategic alliance with 
the ecologist movement which started to consider traditional populations, whose 
lifestyle depended on the forest, as allies for the protection of the Amazon rainfor-
est. The movement gained a decisive momentum at the end of the decade by put-
ting forward new proposals of land tenure for traditional populations, grounded 
on collective land rights. This strategy has been very efficient during the 1990s 
and 2000s, during which about 1,300,000 km2 of rainforest were set apart and 
reserved for the use of “traditional communities” under a variety of legal status. 
But it has also led to mix under the same “collective” etiquette and principles 
a number of different ways of using and managing land and natural resources. 
This assumption however should be nuanced by a careful analysis of the resource 
management systems existing in each case, for they are in general complex and 
mix varying proportions of individual and collective decisions. The aim of this 
paper is to explore this question using the example of the Chico Mendes agro-
extractive settlement (PAE-CM), inhabited by about 100 rubber tapper families 
and symbolic of the political struggle of traditional populations in the Amazon 
for being the home of the rubber tapper leader Chico Mendes assassinated in 
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1988. Applying Ostrom “design principles”, we try to catch what are the local 
institutional arrangements and to see if they suggest collective or individual man-
agement, and what the boundaries between both categories are. As a conclusion, 
we find that the PAE-CM’s system is much less collective than expected, and also 
very much controlled by external authorities, in a logic pretty much away from 
the idea of a CPR system. This finding is useful to understand the shortcomings in 
the actual management of the PAE but also to foresee difficulties which will prob-
ably arise in the management of many of the areas which have gained collective 
land rights or collective management statutes in the Amazon.
Keywords: Amazon, Brazil, common pool resources, design principles, pro-
tected areas, traditional populations
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1. Introduction
The economic modernization of the Amazon fostered by the Brazilian military 
government during the 1960s and 1970s was largely realized without taking into 
consideration the presence of local households which lived from the extraction of 
forest products (mainly non-timber1) and occupied large areas of the rainforest but 
had no legal title to justify their tenure. In the technocratic vision of the govern-
ment, the Amazon was seen as an “empty space” and such families were consid-
ered as mere squatters and often expelled and dispossessed of the areas they lived 
in. These expulsions prompted a political resistance, often guided by the Catholic 
Church which organized these families in “communities” so that they could gain 
a substantial political weight, and also favored the creation of unions based on 
traditional identities (rubber tappers, Quilombolas, fishermen, etc.). During the 
1980s, these unions made a strategic alliance with the ecologist movement, which 
was wary of the deforestation induced by governmental plans. To the eyes of 
some (not all) ecologists, traditional populations, whose lifestyle depended on the 
forest, were basically fighting for the same goals as they did, that is the protection 
of the Amazon rainforest. At the end of the decade, the movement gained a deci-
sive momentum putting forward new proposals for solving the problem of land 
tenure for traditional populations, grounded on collective land rights which were 
viewed as corresponding to their traditional land use.
1 Such practices are named extractivismo in Brazil. Following the literature, we will use the terms 
“extractivism” or “extactivist activities” throughout this paper to refer to them. It mustn’t be con-
fused with extractive industries.
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This strategy has been very efficient during the 1990s and 2000s, during 
which about 1,300,000 km² of rainforest were set apart and reserved for the use of 
“traditional communities” under a variety of legal status. But it has also led to mix 
under the same etiquette and principles a number of different ways of using and 
managing land and natural resources. In particular, all traditional communities 
were considered a priori involved in some kind of collective resource manage-
ment, resulting in collective land titles and land management plans. This assump-
tion however should be nuanced by a careful analysis of the resource management 
systems existing in each case, for they are in general complex and mix varying 
proportions of individual and collective decisions.
The aim of this paper is to explore this question using the example of the Chico 
Mendes agroextractive settlement (PAE-CM),2 inhabited by about 100 rubber tap-
per families and symbolic of the political struggle of traditional populations in the 
Amazon since rubber tappers were at the vanguard of their movement and since the 
PAE-CM was the home of their famous leader Chico Mendes, assassinated in 1988. 
Applying the “design principles” identified by E. Ostrom in her studies of common 
pool resource systems and common property regimes,3 we try to catch what are the 
local institutional arrangements and to see if they suggest collective or individual 
management, and what the boundaries between both categories are. The paper first 
presents the historical context as well as how the new categories of land rights which 
have been created in Brazil at the end of the 1980s relate to the general discussion 
about the commons. We then present the situation of the PAE Chico Mendes and 
analyze the current institutional setting in the light of E. Ostrom’s design principles. 
Finally, we discuss the question of the boundaries between individual and collective 
management and ask whether the PAE-CM should really be considered as a CPR.
2. Context
2.1. The political struggle of the seringueiros in Brazil and the PAE 
Cachoeira
The Acre has been one of the last areas gained by Brazil in the early XXth cen-
tury. At that time, poor peasants coming from the Northeast region of Brazil were 
flooding the Amazon in search of a better living, lured by the fantastic profits 
made by the rich seringalistas (Schmink and Wood 1992). Most of the time, they 
ended trapped by landowners who put them in plots generically named  colocação4 
where they had to collect latex from rubber trees (seringueiras or hevea brasilien-
2 Not to be confused with the Chico Mendes extractive reserve, see Figure 1.
3 The acronym CPR is communally used for both concepts. In this paper we will use “CPR” as the 
acronym of common property regime and “CPR management system” or “CPR system” to designate 
common pool resource management systems. It is important to note that E. Ostrom used to reserve 
the expression “common pool resources” to designate the biophysical system, the interaction be-
tween those systems and local societies being called CPR management systems.
4 Literally “the place where you are put in”.
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sis) scattered in the rainforest and sell it to their patron in exchange of industrial 
goods at prices so high so that the “client” would always be indebted towards his 
“patron” and thus unable to leave his place whatever the working conditions were 
(Hecht and Cockburn 1990). Called aviamento, this system could range from 
interested paternalism to slavery-like brutal exploitation of the workers (Taussig 
1987), who were called seringueiros or rubber tappers. Meanwhile the patrons, 
who were frequently adventurers, became powerful people. They claimed and 
managed to legalize the huge areas (named seringais) where they put their work-
ers in as their properties (Serier 2000).
The fate of rubber as a commodity dramatically changed just before World 
War I (Weinstein 1983; Stokes 2000). The success of the British in cultivating 
hevea in Asia led to massive production in very efficient plantations (an option 
unavailable to the Amazon because of local pests which destroy any concentration 
of seringueiras) and to the collapse of the Amazonian rubber economy.
The seringueiros, however, stayed where they had come and improved their 
knowledge of the forest through intermittent contact (not always peacefully) with 
indigenous peoples and by a local learning process (de Almeida 2002). They were 
still dependent on their patrons but the products they traded were more diversified 
because of the low prices of the rubber and also because the strict rules of the latex 
boom, which were made to maximize rubber production (and also to make the 
Figure 1: Localization of the PAE Chico Mendes in acre.
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seringueiros even more dependent on their patrons), were no longer completely 
enforced (Bakx 1988). They thus started to cultivate small plots, a practice in 
general formerly prohibited. Many of the great landowners would lose their inter-
est on their seringais in the following decades, leaving them in the hands of local 
administrators or abandoning them altogether. This led the seringueiros, in many 
cases, to gain much more autonomy (Stone 2003).
Until the 1970s, the situation remained such in the Acre, a very remote and 
difficult to access part of Brazil. But the investments made by the military-led 
federal government from 1970 on changed the situation. With the consolidation 
of the Brasília-Porto Velho-Rio Branco road (the BR-364), a portion of the lands 
at the border of Bolivia and Peru could now be exploited with high profits, espe-
cially for cattle ranching (Bakx 1988; Revkin 1990; Diegues 1995). Many serin-
gais were sold to new owners, in general coming from the south of Brazil and 
determined to “tame” (desbravar) the Amazon and to turn the forest into a “pro-
ductive land”. The question of the seringueiros, however, was overlooked by both 
parties (de Almeida 2002). The sellers would not take any measure to reallocate 
their former clients to another place, and the buyers would soon consider their 
presence illegitimate and seek to expel them.
Such a process led to the progressive organization of a political resistance 
against expulsion, especially in the county of Xapuri. There, under the leader-
ship of Chico Mendes, the seringueiros created a rural syndicate in 1977 and 
confronted the expulsions, to the surprise and dismay of the federal government 
(Allegretti 2008). They used a passive resistance technique named “empate” 
(impeach), invading the deforestation sites with families, kids and babies against 
whom the landowner’s henchmen could not fight without creating public out-
rage. During the 1980s, the seringueiro movement gained a national audience 
with the creation of the Seringueiros’ National Council in 1985 and changed its 
ideological basis (de Almeida 2002; Schmink 2011). At first, it had tried to force 
the federal government to an “agrarian reform” where individual plots, corre-
sponding to the colocações, would be distributed to the actual occupants. But the 
government proved reluctant to accept giving bigger plots to the seringueiros than 
it did to colonists, and thus wanted to limit the size of the properties to 100 ha, an 
unfeasible size as far as extractivist activities are concerned. The lack of success 
with the agrarian reform strategy made the seringueiros look towards the ecolo-
gist movement and change their discourse. They started to present themselves 
as “guardians of the forest” against the deforestation, which was peaking at that 
time and raised international concern (da Cunha and de Almeida 2000). They also 
worked out a new proposal for securing their land rights, inspired by the model of 
Indigenous reserves which were created by the Federal government: the creation 
of areas collectively held by extractivists where they could pursue their traditional 
activities according to their norms and rules and which could protect their tenure 
against external invasions or encroachment. But even if a first model for this type 
of settlement was presented as early as 1986, the government was not ready to 
endorse it at that time.
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Tension in Acre was high throughout the 1980s. In 1988, Chico Mendes was 
assassinated by a farmer who had bought some parts of the seringal where Chico 
Mendes and his family lived (Revkin 1990). The repercussion of the case was 
intense at national and international level and forced the government to put an 
end to the stalemate and create first the PAE and then the RESEX categories 
(see Section 2.2). The area near the trijunction Brazil/Peru/Bolivian, from which 
Chico Mendes and other seringueiro leaders originated, benefited from both 
mechanisms. First of all Chico Mendes’ original area, the seringal Cachoeira, was 
turned into the “PAE Chico Mendes” in 1989.5 Then a huge RESEX was created 
north of the BR-364 road and named RESEX Chico Mendes. In this study we will 
focus on the first one.
2.2. Collective land rights and environmental protection: PAE and RESEX 
statutes
The alliance between the seringueiros and the ecologists was not evident at first. 
For decades ecologist movements had been considering that the human pres-
ence is incompatible with the preservation of nature, following the so-called 
“Yellowstone model” where the creation of protected areas implied the eviction 
of local population. During the 1980s however, they changed their doctrine and 
started to consider the forest communities (Indigenous peoples but also rubber 
tappers or riverine dwellers, all designated by “traditional people or communi-
ties” or “forest people”, see Redford and Padoch 1992) as efficient protectors of 
the environment (McNeely 1995), therefore deserving the recognition of special 
land rights (Colchester 1994; Murrieta and Rueda 1995; Brown 2002). Some, 
like Diegues (1998a) even considered that traditional communities were inher-
ently prone to environmental conservation since the outstanding biodiversity of 
the rainforest is in part a byproduct of their presence and resource management, a 
point which was much debated over.
Introduced by the seringueiros in their demand for “extractive reserves” 
from 1985 on, the choice for a collective usufruct (as opposed to private property 
rights) has been a point of consensus between both parts (Allegretti 1990; Hall 
1997). This was also due to the influence of Indigenous peoples in the ecologist 
lobby at that time and to the fact that other types of traditional communities were 
often considered as sharing a number of social characteristics with them, espe-
cially collective systems of land management. Hence, the concept of extractive 
reserve was very much inspired by Indigenous reserves (Rosendo 2007). Also, the 
intellectual influence of the discussion about the commons may be acknowledged. 
Progressively, a consensus appeared about the idea that, contrary to Hardin’s 
“tragedy of the commons”, disasters would occur more surely if individual prop-
erty rights were granted to the members of those communities, whereas collective 
5 This area has, therefore, two names: its former denomination “seringal Cachoeira” and its current 
denomination “PAE Chico Mendes”. Many people continue to refer to it as “Cachoeira”.
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titles would deter deforestation. From “communally managed areas” (Fearnside 
1989) to “collective” institutions or “commons” (Diegues 1998b, 2000; Cardoso 
2002), a semantic slip soon occurred, leaving to believe that all traditional groups 
had common pool management systems regardless of the reality and complexity 
of local arrangements.
Currently, aside from land title granted on an ethnic basis (Indigenous ter-
ritories and quilombo areas) three types of collective tenure exist in Brazil. The 
first one is the Projeto de assentamento extrativista – PAE (renamed Projeto de 
assentatmento agro-extrativista in 1996). It is under the control of the INCRA, 
the federal body in charge of colonization and agrarian reform. It has been created 
in 1987, directly under the influence of CNS’s claims. The big difference with 
other colonization settlements created by the INCRA is that in this case there is no 
individual land title. A right of use (concessão de direito real de uso) is transferred 
to the local association, which in turn grants it to its members provided that they 
respect a number of rules. This creation of this status has been very innovative in 
Brazil at that time since the federal government, which had been dominated by a 
right wing military dictatorship from the 1960s until 1985 and was still ruled by 
conservative politicians during the second part of the 1980s, was very reluctant to 
accept collective land rights.
The second type of collective areas, created in 1990 also in the aftermath of 
Chico Mendes’ death, is the Extractive reserve (Reserva extrativista – RESEX). 
Ruled by the IBAMA, the federal body in charge of conservation units, they have 
more or less the same characteristics as the PAE but, as they are inserted inside the 
national system of protected areas, their objective is explicitly to protect the envi-
ronment. Finally, in the middle of the 1990s a third status was created, the “sus-
tainable development reserve” (RDS), which is somehow a clone of the extractive 
reserve but may be created in areas where local populations do not live only out 
of extractivism (Le Tourneau and Kohler 2014).
A number of points have already been analyzed in the scientific literature 
about the RESEX and the PAE statutes, like the question of their internal and 
external institutional architecture (Brown and Rosendo 2000a; Rosendo 2003; 
Ehringhaus 2006), their relation with empowerment (Brown and Rosendo 2000b), 
or their influence on deforestation (Vadjunec 2007, 2011). However, if the man-
agement and the economy of the colocações have been quite thoroughly analyzed 
(Cardoso 1999; Wallace 2004; Ehringhaus 2006; Vadjunec 2007, 2011), the ques-
tion of individual vs collective dimensions of the land use management system 
has not been addressed as such.
2.3. Common pool resources, common property resources and design 
principles
Common pool resources are resources which may be accessed by a number of 
individuals, but are finite, divisible or substractable and which may be the object 
of exclusion by part of the users against others even if this exclusion has a high 
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cost (Ostrom et al. 1999; Ostrom 2008). They are different from public goods, like 
air or digital knowledge: common pool resources are not open access, and may be 
covered by property rights (eventually common property), which may be formal 
or informal and diverse in their extension, from access to alienation (Schlager and 
Ostrom 1992). Common pool resource management systems, are the systems set 
up, mostly by local communities, in order to access and exploit their common 
pool resources.
Reacting to Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” (1968), which assumes 
that common pool resources are fated to overuse and destruction because they 
inherently invite users to freeride upon them, Elinor Ostrom pointed out that 
many common pool resource systems still existed worldwide and that they 
were functional and even successful: contrary to the expected tragedy, water 
resources, fishing banks or forests could be managed collectively by commu-
nities with economic and ecological success. She therefore studied what fac-
tors made such system enduring or not and proposed a set of eight “design 
principles” (Ostrom 1990, 2009; Ostrom et al. 1999). Those are not rules nor 
recipes for success, but were derived from the observation of hundreds of cases 
where they proved to be present, at different degrees, in most of the successful 
ones. Importantly, the long-term sustainability of a system is not linked with 
the extent to which any given principle is present, but with the extent to which 
the aggregation of principles is  present. The robustness of the principles was 
extensively reviewed by Cox et al. in 2010, based on the analysis of 91 studies 
done within the design principles framework, and some were reformulated or 
modified. In this paper we will use this latter formulation of the principles as 
the base of our analysis.
Common pool resource systems are a “third way”, distinct from pure indi-
vidual private property and from full state ownership, where communities self-
organize in order to manage collectively a common asset (Ostrom and Ostrom 
2003). Importantly, not every resource has to be collective in a given system: in 
an irrigation system, water may be managed collectively but the fields may be 
individual properties. Also, the profits derived from the resources may be indi-
vidual, the CPR system only implying that the community controls the access to 
resources (Richards 1997).
The way the community organizes itself is called “institutions”. Institutions 
are sets of rules, rights and obligations which frame the conduct of the members 
and, if respected, lead to the success of the CPR system. The “design principles” 
are recurring parameters which proved to be important for effective CPR manage-
ment systems (Ostrom 1990, 2009; Ostrom et al. 1999). Their formulation was 
slightly modified by Cox et al. (2010). They include:
1. Clearly defined boundaries for resource (what is exactly the resource 
and where it is located) and users (who is a legitimate user and who is 
not);
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2. Congruence of rules with local conditions (rules coherent with the ecolog-
ical possibilities) and between appropriation and provision rules (favora-
ble cost-benefit ratio for the participants);
3. Collective choice arrangements (participants have a say in the rules affect-
ing them);
4. Monitoring (capacity for monitoring the resource and also the users);
5. Graduated sanctions (the fact that there is an incremental grade for 
offenses and sanctions);
6. Conflict resolution mechanisms (the existence of instances – chiefs, 
judges, councils, etc. – and rules to promote conflict resolution and mini-
mize the cost of conflict resolution);
7. Minimal recognition of rights (the capacity and right for the local com-
munity to establish its own rules on the resources);
8. Nested organization (the existence of several levels of management and 
political decision).
In this paper, we have chosen to consider the PAE Chico Mendes as a CPR man-
agement systems and a common property regime. Such assumptions lie on sev-
eral factors. First, tropical forests are frequently assimilated as common pool 
resources as they share most of their characteristics: divisibility, substractability 
and difficulty of control and enforcement due to the nature of the rainforest. Thus, 
the 24,898 ha of the PAE may be considered as a common pool resource for the 
seringueiros who inhabit it. Second, the INCRA ordinance defines the right of use 
received by the communities in a PAE as a “regime comunial” which may be trans-
lated by “common property regime”, leaving the concessionary communities to 
decide if the form adopted for the management is an association, a condominium 
or a cooperative.6 Behind this legal definition is the idea that extractive communi-
ties already have rules of use (“cultural peculiarities” mentioned in the preamble 
of the text) and that they will be able to develop “activities which are economi-
cally feasible, socially just and ecologically sustainable”. The vocabulary as well 
as the context and the stress put on a collective regime managed by associations 
(which is the form chosen by most of the PAEs) justify that we consider the PAE 
as a de facto CPR institution.7 However the reality is more complex since most 
of the authors acknowledge that, in the case of the rubber tappers, the individual 
plots (named colocações) are the relevant production units (Schwartzman 1989) 
and that they therefore present the case of “mixed” (Vadjunec 2007) or “hybrid” 
(Ehringhaus 2006) property and resource systems.
6 The 1996 INCRA ordinance re-defining the PAE statute indicates: “the destination of the lands for 
such settlements will be given through a right of use, in a comunial regime, according to the form 
decided by the concessionary communities – association, condominium or cooperative.”
7 Interestingly, the communal dimension of management is much less present in the legal definition 
of extractive reserves (law 9985/2000) even if they are considered by many authors as paramount 
examples of CPR in the Amazon.
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Our point here is to see how the PAE Chico Mendes rules incorporate both 
the individual and collective dimensions, and the importance of each. To that 
end, we investigate the rules governing the use of an array of resources which are 
important locally (their importance is shown in Section 2) using the design prin-
ciples as an analytical framework.8 This analysis led to the elaboration of a table 
(Table 2) which we analyze in Section 3. The findings are discussed in section IV. 
The overall objective of this study was to evaluate the extent of the local CPR as 
far as different resources are considered.
2.4. Methods
The present study has been conducted with the support of the DURAMAZ project 
phase 2 (Le Tourneau and Droulers 2010; Le Tourneau et al. 2013). This multi-
disciplinary research project aims at studying sustainability in the Amazon by 
comparing the evolution of several sites of different types (colonization projects, 
traditional communities, agribusiness areas, etc.). To that end, extensive field-
work has been conducted on each site, including the gathering of systematic eco-
nomic and social data, and also the elaboration of an institutional analysis in the 
perspective of a general cross-sites comparison.
All data presented here were thus collected during the fieldwork held in 
the PAE Chico Mendes in July-August of 2013,9 when 72 families have been 
interviewed, representing 80% of the PAE’s population. Interviews included 
structured questionnaires about economic and social aspects, and also open dis-
cussions. Among other data used within this paper, income figures were collected 
in face to face interviews where informants would detail all of their formal10 
income sources and estimate how much they had gained from them during the 
last year.
Meetings were also held with leaders and important persons of the PAE on 
the basis of informal conversations in order to gather elements about the local 
institutional arrangements, which were later checked with other informants before 
or after the formal interviews. Finally, written documents, such as the PAE man-
agement plan, were carefully studied and confronted with the interviews’ content. 
The formal and informal rules governing the use of natural resources and the 
tenure arrangements were extracted from those data using a special form elabo-
rated by the DURAMAZ research team after E. Ostrom design principles and 
institutional analysis device. This form was created ahead of the fieldwork and its 
categories and questions were used as a blueprint to orient the data gathering and 
informal interviews.
8 Some of the principles were used by Vadjunec (2011) in her analysis of the Chico Mendes Extrac-
tive reserve, but as variable of her analysis and not as a system like we are doing here.
9 After a first campaign in 2008.
10 Formal means monetary here. Salaries, pensions but also timber, Brazil nut or latex sales are mon-
etary transactions and people know the amount of each. Obviously this formal income is completed 
by informal sources like subsistence agriculture.
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3. The current situation of the PAE Chico Mendes
3.1. Status and governance
The PAE Chico Mendes was created by the Ministry of agriculture decree n°158 
of 8th march of 1989, with an area of 24,898 ha, benefiting 68 families. The fed-
eral government is the proprietary of the land, local residents being granted a right 
of use (concessão de direito real de uso). The PAE is ruled by an inner regulation 
elaborated jointly by the INCRA and the local population, which was sanctioned 
only in 1997. The text defines which activities are allowed in the PAE and to what 
extent. For instance, deforestation is limited to 10% of each colocação and cattle 
ranching is authorized but must be limited to 30 heads by family. One polemical 
point is the exploitation of timber. Article 12 of the Management Plan of the PAE 
states that: “The entrance of wood loggers is forbidden in this PAE, with the aim 
of realizing commercial wood exploitation of any form”. However, it leaves open 
the possibility of “forest management”. As we will see later on, timber is today an 
important economic activity in the PAE.
The regulation clearly assumes that there is a collective management of the 
PAE, and makes the local association the effective intermediary with public bod-
ies. However, the internal organization of the PAE is grounded on the colocações, 
or plots occupied by the seringueiros’ families. As they are not properties, those 
cannot be sold: in case a family wishes to abandon its plot, the right of use is trans-
ferred to another by the general assembly, which chooses the beneficiary, and the 
procedure is afterwards validated by the INCRA. This does not imply that there 
is no monetary transaction implied. The former tenant may claim a compensation 
for the benfeitorias, i.e. for the investments he has made on the land. Most of the 
times, the compensation process is merely a way to overcome the legal prohibi-
tion on plot sale, the amount of money claimed being equal to the theoretical price 
of the property.
The colocações’ distribution and boundaries have been inherited from the 
seringal Cachoeira, and were not altered by the creation of the PAE. They are 
not equal in size, which was originally estimated assuming that each rubber 
trail (estrada de seringueiras) was about 100 ha in size; the original colocações 
had from 2 to 12 trails, or an extension ranging from about 200 ha to 1200 ha. 
However, a process of division of the colocações started at the end of the 1990s 
in order to accommodate the new families formed by the seringueiros’ children. 
The number of units grew from 68 to 89, but this was quickly seen as a threat to 
the PAE’s integrity, since some of the new colocações were considered very small 
and unfeasible. From 2008 on, the INCRA decided not to recognize any more the 
subdivisions in order to freeze the process. However as young people get mar-
ried, new families continue to appear on the original plots, but now without any 
official recognition of their presence or rights. They are called agregados and their 
absence of official status is a serious issue nowadays.
Isolation has been one of the main other issues faced by the seringueiros. 
Until the 2000s, most of the colocações were very difficult to access, since the 
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road stopped at the entrance of the PAE, forcing people to take small forest trails 
to get to their home or to evacuate their production. This point greatly improved 
in the last 10 years. A number of internal roads (ramais) were opened in the PAE, 
making a number of colocações (not all of them) much closer to the cities of 
Xapuri or Epitaciolândia. Also, the roads brought energy to many houses, fulfill-
ing an important local demand. It is important to note that these roads have been 
opened in connection with the project of expanding community timber production 
and that they have been of utmost importance in the decision of many families to 
engage in this activity. Today over 80% of the households have energy, against 
only 47% in 2007.
There are currently two associations in the PAE. The first one, named 
Associação dos Moradores e Produtores do PAE Chico Mendes (AMPPAE-CM), 
was created in 1989. Including 58 families today, it is the historical association 
and it is in general ruled by relatives of Chico Mendes. A second one appeared in 
2007, principally composed by families living in the center or in the backside of 
the PAE, in reaction to the perception that families living at the entrance of the 
area did monopolize development projects and other benefits. It represents 29 
families today. After a period of colder relationships, the two associations appar-
ently managed to find a common ground and they have worked along the same 
lines since 2011. It is worth to mention that each association defines its members 
as “rural producers” in their status and not as “seringueiros”.
The associations’ decisions are monitored by the INCRA, which has the 
power to overrule them if it finds them contrary to the management plan or to the 
general objectives of the PAE’s status.
3.2. The current economic activities
The economic activities of the PAE are rather diversified, and not every family 
is involved in each activity (See Table 1). The most important from a symbolical 
point of view is rubber extraction, which gives their identity to the seringueiros. 
However, due to the very low price of rubber on the local market, it had almost 
ceased to exist in the beginning of the 2000s. A certain revival happened since 
then, with the institution of public subsidies on the rubber price by the Acre gov-
ernment. Moreover, from 2007 on, the federal government started a program based 
on the creation of a male condom production facility in Xapuri, which uses liquid 
rubber as its primary material and offers good prices for it. But the work is hard 
since the latex must be kept liquid, which means that the collecting activity must 
be done swiftly and also that the seringueiro has to handle chemical products.
The other main extractivist activity of the PAE is the collection of Brazil nut, 
which is sold to the local cooperatives or to private firms. As the nut price was 
very good in the last years, almost all the families are involved (60 of 72), the 
limitation being the quantity of Brazil nut trees present in their colocações. From 
our fieldwork, it appears that this activity is the most important economic activity 
in the PAE, with 41 families out of 72 placing it as their most lucrative activity 
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(only 6 families place timber extraction as most lucrative, 4 cattle raising and 4 
latex extraction).
The last significant economically forest activity is timber collection. It has 
been initiated with the help of NGOs like WWF in the beginning of the 2000s 
among intense controversies (Stone 2003). How could the seringueiros, who 
fought against the deforestation done by farmers, turn themselves into timber 
sellers? However, as, at that time, extractive products (including Brazil nut) had 
very low prices on the market, it was decided that this option was not to be over-
looked. Guarantees were also given that the exploitation would be sustainable, 
by the adoption of low impact forest management practices certified by the FSC. 
The original project involved a participation of the seringueiros themselves at all 
stages of the production process (complying with the management plan prohibi-
tion of the entrance of madeireiros in the PAE), and the production of high value 
timber for luxury furniture designers in São Paulo. But this market niche never 
really materialized.
In 2005, with the support of WWF the COOPERFLORESTA (Cooperativa 
dos Produtores Florestais Comunitários – Cooperative of community managed 
forest producers), was set up in order to commercialize the timber. As rational-
ization was also sought for, the production process, originally manual, was rede-
signed with the use of skidders and the entrance of specialized teams. As a result, 
fewer seringueiros were involved in it. Two years later, the Acre government ini-
tiated a policy based on the expansion of forest management and exploitation by 
local communities. One of the pillars of this policy was the opening of new roads 
in the areas which would engage in the program, in order to facilitate the trans-
portation of the production. The PAE thus saw the opening of more than 60 km of 
new roads (ramais), responding a long standing demand by the seringueiros. But 
in this new project timber was to be harvested by local firms, meaning in practice 
that madeireiros would enter the PAE (which they already did since some of the 
seringueiros already sold timber when needing money) and that the seringueiros 
would passively receive the timber’s price. This was a conflictive issue since the 
management plan explicitly prohibited such a process. After some discussions 
Table 1: Sources of income and participation of the PAE-CM seringueiros in economic activi-
ties (source: field interviews).
Activity Gross 
revenue in 
the PAE-CM
Minimum 
income 
Maximum 
income
Number 
of families 
involved
Mean 
income
% families 
involved
Latex 38,830 R$ 400 R$ 4000 R$ 28 1493 R$ 39%
Brazil nut 256,400 R$ 300 R$ 18,000 R$ 60 4273 R$ 83%
Timber 63,500 R$ 500 R$ 15,500 R$ 11 5773 R$ 15%
Cattle 88,080 R$ 100 R$ 15,000 R$ 29 3037 R$ 41%
Salaries 13,094 R$ 648 R$ 2000 R$ 13 1007 R$ 18%
Pensions and social benefits 25,069 R$ 60 R$ 1356 R$ 50 487 R$ 69%
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between both associations, a middle ground was found: the harvest would be 
made by the COOPERFLORSTA and not by madeireiros,11 and the colocações’ 
owners would also pledge FSC certification in order to comply with the coopera-
tive’s inner regulation and ensure that exploitation is sustainable.
If it has prompted important debates, timber extraction remains somehow 
marginal in the PAE from the economic point of view. Only 11 families have 
declared revenues linked with timber selling in 2013, a proportion much inferior 
to the 80% of the families officially involved in this activity. This may be linked 
with the instability of the COOPERFLORESTA, which, despite continuous pub-
lic financial support, struggles to achieve continuity in its activities and to find 
markets.
The other economic activities of the PAE are linked with agriculture. Most 
of them are subsistence-type activities, which provide a great part of families’ 
diet. Sale of agricultural products is not very frequent except for cattle. There 
are currently about 1336 cattle heads in the PAE. If this yields a mean number of 
25 by family, under the threshold of 30 heads defined in the management plan, 
many colocações hold more than 50 heads, two having more than 100 heads 
(120 and 160 heads). This fact has collective impacts as cattle ranching implies 
the opening of permanent pasture and was responsible for a surge of deforesta-
tion in the PAE which reached 10% in the middle of the 2000s. As the internal 
rule of the PAE fixes this value as the maximal deforestation value, INCRA 
and IBAMA have prohibited new clearings since that time.12 The problem is 
that not every family had reached their deforestation quota and that the type 
of agriculture practiced by the seringueiros implies the cutting of about 1ha of 
forest areas each year, which are exploited during a few years and then left in 
fallow during 10–20 years. With the current situation, people are forced to work 
only on the already existing fallows, in shorter cycle, a new practice that they 
do not master and which implies either mechanization or fertilization in order 
to be sustainable.  
Aside from productive activities, salaries have become a source of income in 
the PAE, even if they concern only 14% of the families. Most of them are linked 
with public employment (school teachers, nurses, etc.), but some are also linked 
with timber extraction. Social benefits, which reflect the social policies promoted 
at the national level by the federal government, are much more important. About 
20% of the households receive retirement pensions of about 800 R$ per month, 
and 40% receive family allocations of about 100 R$. The total of all those incomes 
11 Even if there is no real practical difference between the two processes, the COOPERFLORESTA 
is a cooperative of small producers and not a firm ruled by a madeireiro, which makes a big symboli-
cal difference.
12 The management plan also states that only half of the allowed clearing (or 5% of the colocação’s 
area) may be converted into pasture. Those who want to raise cattle frequently overpass also this 
limit.
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was of about 525,000 R$ in 2013, which is probably more or less equal to the total 
revenue of all the economic activities.13
4. Resources and rules in the PAE Chico Mendes
In order to analyze how the CPR management system in the PAE-CM works, we 
chose to focus on four different resources available to the seringueiros and con-
nected with their territory. The first one is non-timber forest products, especially 
rubber and Brazil nut. The second is timber. The third is cattle. The fourth is dif-
ferent in nature since we have chosen to consider land as a resource. This allows 
us to analyze some issues which would have passed unnoticed if we were to focus 
only on economic resources, such as the shortage of land to accommodate the 
new families. Table 2 summarizes the rules and facts linked with each resource in 
function of the 8 design principles (in the version of Cox et al. 2010).
1A, 1B & 2A User and resource boundaries and congruence with local conditions
Most of the legitimate users of the resources are defined as the families owning a 
given colocação. They are registered by the INCRA, which issues a type of ID card 
called cartão de assentamento. However, this social boundary is relativized in two 
ways as far as land is concerned. First of all, in the immediate aftermath of the PAE 
creation, some colocações were sold and newcomers, who favored cattle ranching 
against extractivism, were able to step in. This has however been made much more 
difficult, if not impossible, by INCRA in the last decade. Second, and more impor-
tant, as young people get married, they tend to install themselves in separate houses 
and to open their own agricultural plots. But as the INCRA has prohibited any new 
subdivision of the actual colocações, the new households are not recognized. They 
are called agregados (“aggregates”) and cannot participate in the projects which are 
implemented in the area, be granted a clearing license in order to open a new agri-
cultural plot, or pledge credit for agricultural activities of any kind. In 2013, about 25 
families were in this situation, out of a total of 104 families living in the PAE’s area.
Regarding the physical boundaries of the resources, most of them are defined 
in relation to the colocações’ extent. This does not mean that the resources are 
equally distributed, but that the limits recognized socially for their exploitation 
are not following ecological patterns. The colocações’ boundaries (Figure 2) were 
always considered as very clear by the tenants, but there were no map showing 
them. Today, the management rules associated with timber extraction imposed the 
realization of a detailed cartography showing the properties’ limits as well as the 
exact determination of the areas to be exploited. Some spaces are considered as 
collective, like ponds or streams where all users may collect resources.
2B Appropriation and provision rules
13 It is difficult to calculate this amount since some activities are not immediately converted in 
money (for instance the augmentation of cattle heads, which may be sold or not depending on the 
circumstances) and since the importance of the subsistence agriculture is very difficult to evaluate.
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The 2B design principle may be short labelled as the cost/benefit relation of the 
system for each user. The PAE management plan provides a number of rules to be 
obeyed in the exploitation of the colocação. Most of them are about how rubber 
must be collected and how rubber trees must be taken care of. There are also pro-
visions about deforestation, timber extraction (only possible within management 
plans), non-timber forest products extraction and cattle ranching. Some provi-
sions are also made on collective spaces, mainly the access roads and the streams 
and rivers. Some fishing techniques are prohibited in the latter.
The rules (which are at times infringed), broadly determine which activities 
are allowed, which are prohibited and which may be allowed if they are proved 
sustainable “by technical reports”. Most of the “costs” for participating from the 
CPR may be viewed as individual investments which the user may valorize as 
Figure 2: Map of the colocações boundaries (background Landsat eight image 01/09/2013). 
About 5% of the colocações could not be plotted on the map because of lack of information.
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benfeitorias: taking care of the rubber tapping trails and Brazil nut trees, con-
structing fences for cattle… The only real costs are mostly limitations, especially 
those imposed on cattle ranching and on the colocações’ sales. But both are even-
tually bypassed by various mechanisms.
As for the benefits, they are mostly depending on the colocação management, 
which means that they are only marginally affected, at least on a short term basis, 
by the good functioning of the CPR.
3 Collective choice
The management plan was elaborated jointly by the INCRA and the local 
population but the latter made it more open than the seringueiros were ini-
tially willing to, allowing, for instance, some forms of timber extraction. In 
general, the local population choices must always be validated by the INCRA. 
Thus, even if the general assembly agrees to the recognition of new coloca-
ções, either by subdivision or by the transfer of right of use, the INCRA may 
bar this decision.
If most of the colocações management decisions are individual (to exploit or 
not a given resource, to develop or not the agriculture, to raise cattle or not, etc.), 
it must be noted that timber exploitation is different in that respect. First of all, 
engaging in the program of collective forest management is made through the 
associations and is thus associated to a collective choice. It was a much debated 
issue among the families in the 2000s. Second, given the technical aspects of 
collective forest management laws in Brazil, the decision about which area of 
the colocação will be exploited, and about which trees will be felled is made by 
technicians appointed by the COOPERFLORESTA and not by the seringueiros 
themselves.
4A & 4B User and resource monitoring
The management plan does not provide for any effective monitoring mechanism. 
Most of the existing monitoring is about looking to what the neighbor is doing and 
reporting it to the associations’ general assemblies. The lack of internal monitor-
ing may explain why some colocações passed the deforestation threshold or the 
cattle heads maximum number.
External monitoring of the deforestation is done by federal or state agencies in 
charge of emitting deforestation authorization. Those have prohibited new open-
ings since 2008 because the overall deforestation rate passed the 10% limit.
5 Graduated sanctions
The management plan mentions two levels of sanctions. The first one consists in 
a formal (i.e. written) warning issued by the local association. After two warnings 
the general assembly may communicate the case to the INCRA, which may break 
the contract of the misbehaving family and expel it from the PAE. Additionally or 
alternatively, people may be subject to the penalties defined in the environmental 
laws, especially in the case of unauthorized deforestation or unauthorized use 
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of fire. Practically, the sanctions are never put into effect. The only mechanism 
which seems to have an effect is the external monitoring of deforestation. Some 
of the PAE’s leaders are quite convinced that satellite imagery is efficient to moni-
tor unauthorized burnings or forest clearings, and they are concerned with the 
fact that clearing authorizations are no more issued. But this sanction is collec-
tive, whereas the infringements are individual. At the same time, the deforestation 
today seems to have lowered, but control authorities are lagging in acknowledg-
ing this new situation.
6 Conflict resolution
No explicit conflict resolution mechanism was set up. Obviously the associations 
are the privileged forums for discussing misbehavior and mediating conflicts, but 
this is not clearly explained in the PAE status. Informal talks with INCRA techni-
cians also occur, but they are not a regular mechanism. Also, several prominent 
families, especially those linked to Chico Mendes, have an important influence 
on the others.
7 Right to organize
The PAE-CM rules were produced in part by local consultations, and then slightly 
modified and sanctioned by the INCRA. Furthermore, the local associations are 
the principal partners for the PAE-CM management. Regarding timber, if the first 
attempt was done in close partnership with the seringueiros, the state sponsored 
system was imposed in exchange for the opening of roads.
8 Nested organization
The PAE is very well inserted in a nested network because of its political impor-
tance as the homeland of Chico Mendes. This network involves municipal author-
ities (when the PT political party is in charge in Xapuri), state government (ruled 
by the PT since 1998) and several local (CTA) and international (WWF) NGOs. 
Because of it, the PAE Chico Mendes has benefited from a number of social, 
educational or development programs, and is always in the first line in the state 
government initiatives (Le Tourneau and Droulers 2010). This explains its role 
as one of the most emblematic suppliers of the COOPERFLORESTA,14 as well 
as its excellent level of equipment compared to other forest areas. The networks 
involved are different in function of the resources, but not all are governance 
networks. In the case of extractivist productions, they are more commercializa-
tion networks. In the case of timber, the COOPERFLORESTA was designed to 
include local governance and economic aspects. In the case of land, the relation 
with INCRA shows much more a top-down organization.
14 Even if the cooperative engineers do not consider it as a very interesting area if considering its 
potential for timber production.
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5. Discussion
One of the most celebrated features of the PAE (and later RESEX) status was that 
they were based on collective land rights. But does this guarantee that they are 
functional CPR management systems? The detailed analysis conducted in section 
III allows us to pinpoint a set of issues which show that there are flaws in the col-
lective management system.
The question of the agregados is probably one of the most critical issues and 
shows many of the shortcomings of the current system. It may be explained by 
demographic factors: the seringueiros continue to have large families (even if far 
more restricted than before). Also, as the PAE has a relative economic success 
and is very well served in terms of education and transport infrastructure, families 
avoid migrating to the city. Therefore, emigration from the PAE is low, and young 
people prefer to stay. Those factors create a demand for new plots, but there are no 
collective areas where they could be opened since the PAE is already completely 
appropriated. It could be handled up to a certain point by having the colocações’ 
subdivisions acknowledged by the associations and the new families accepted 
as members of the PAE, as it has been the case until the mid-2000s. But since 
the INCRA, fearing abuses, decided not to release new cartões de assentamento 
inequality was created between the official families and the agregados. People in 
the PAE are quite divided regarding the issue since they would like to see many 
of the young people recognized as members of the PAE, but at the same time they 
acknowledge that subdivisions may lead to economically unfeasible plots.15
What seems clear is that the management rules adopted in the 1997 plan had 
no long time vision. Until the PAE creation, this question was handled by the 
seringal’s owner. There is thus little local practice in relation to the question of 
inheritance of the rights on the land – since there were no rights. Probably, on 
this point rules will have to be reconsidered, but it is not clear how a consensus 
might emerge among the population. Also, the relative power of the INCRA and 
the local associations may have to be reconsidered since the possibility for the 
INCRA to overrule creates a situation where no negotiation is possible.
Looking at this fact and at how the design principles are implemented in the 
PAE-CM, we see that in many cases the local system does not satisfy to the crite-
ria of a successful CPR system. One of the primary flaws is linked with local par-
ticipation and the interference of external actors. The PAE status is to be enforced 
by the INCRA, which has the final word on many issues, reducing the possibility 
for the seringueios to make decisions on their own (for instance divide their land 
in order to accommodate their sons) or to change the rules. The state government 
also entered the area and imposed a forest exploitation system which was alien 
to local demands and rules. Recognizing these issues, Ehringhaus speaks of the 
extractive reserves as an “hybrid land tenure system” where “state and local com-
munities share authority over land and resources to different degrees” (2006, 10). 
15 Or feasible only by adopting unsustainable practices…
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But as the INCRA has the last word on most issues, it might be wondered whether 
there is any sharing at all in the case of the PAEs.
As for monitoring, as the colocação is mostly a private area, it is difficult for 
the neighbors to monitor each other. The “protection committee” established in 
the status does not seem very active. Therefore, most of the monitoring is left to 
the external control by state or federal agencies. Furthermore, the sanction system 
is not very efficient. Bringing the misbehaving families in front of the general 
assembly is very difficult to achieve, and eventual expulsions would have to be 
pronounced by the INCRA, showing one more time the interference by federal 
or state powers. In the absence of an efficient monitoring, families’ choices may 
contradict the inner regulation and impact the collectivity, as was the case with 
deforestation. But they were not sanctioned individually and, instead, the current 
prohibition of new clearings affects the PAE collectively.
One may also question the “collective” nature of the system. As principle 2B 
shows, the colocações owners put little investment in the collective part of the 
system. They must comply with the rules and participate in the assemblies, but 
they do not contribute by their work or by paying fees. All the more, most deci-
sions they take in relation to resources (like to engage or not into an activity) are 
individual and not collective, as well as the benefits are only individual: maintain-
ing the resources on one’s colocação does only marginally influence the benefits 
of the others. Such a lack of collective choices leads to the apparition of ever 
more distinct economic profiles among the families, which could in turn weaken 
their collective identity, or at least change its components, as shown by Gomes 
et al. (2012). In the case of timber, the associations had to insist much in order to 
convince the families to join the project and to enter the FSC certification. Also 
in this case, the national legislation about community forest management is being 
more important than local rules.
On other basis, Vadjunec (2007) had already concluded that the Chico Mendes 
Extractive reserve was a weak common property regime, while Cardoso also con-
sidered the PAE status as weak in this respect. But our analysis may lead to ques-
tion if the PAE-CM is a CPR system at all. Authors have argued that the nature of 
the rainforest made the seringais CPR systems, or that the colocações boundaries 
were overlapping, which made them de fato CPR (Cardoso 1999; Ehringhaus 
2006; Vadjunec 2007). But when the forestry operations required that colocações 
limits were mapped in the PAE-CM, those appeared to fit perfectly (or even-
tual dissensions were quickly resolved) and no overlapping was apparent. As for 
the resources, all of those with an economic value are individually appropriated 
(i.e. the owner of the colocação is the only legitimate appropriator), regardless 
of the uneven distribution of the trees or the fertility of the land. Therefore, there 
are very few items which are really under a collective management: mainly the 
streams and ponds, as well as the area at the entrance of the PAE-CM where some 
collective facilities were built.
The limits of the PAE-CM as a collectively managed area may be better 
understood if we recall the historical context of the political struggle of the rub-
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ber tapper for their land rights (Part I). The initial claim was about having their 
colocações recognized individually by a legal title. It is the intransigency of the 
Federal government in accepting the legalization of their tenure (in part because 
their extension was far greater than what was allowed inside the agrarian reform 
program) that they sought new devices and eventually proposed collectively 
owned areas as a solution. But acting collectively was not an evident product of a 
common history and, on the contrary, quite a novelty for the rubber tappers. First 
hand testimonies, like Gomercindo Rodrigues’ one, show that in the 1970s they 
were mainly divided and individualistic and that the construction of their union 
has been a long and arduous journey. “Mistrust” was widespread between them 
and “…organization was somewhat forced on them from outside…” (2007, 102). 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the formal and informal rules and the PAE-CM 
are not fully compliant with the definition of a successful CPR: as a matter of fact, 
the PAE creation was not the recognition of a long living CPR system and on the 
contrary for most of it the creation of a new system.
This does not mean that the seringueiros were not interested in it. On the 
contrary, they had perfectly understood that this was the only way to secure 
their land rights, which was their prime objective. But once this achieved, dif-
ferent views on what to do on these lands emerged. Many of them now want to 
turn to other preoccupations, like livelihood improvement, even if this may be, 
at times, in contradiction with the provisions or philosophy of the system they 
have entered in, or if this may imply a redefinition of their identity (Gomes et al. 
2012).
6. Conclusion
The seringueiros were one of the most organized and powerful political group in 
the 80s in the Amazon and they were very instrumental in obtaining from the fed-
eral government new forms of land titles based on collective rights. The PAE-CM 
is emblematic of those, especially since, as Ehringhaus (2006) has pointed out, its 
status has served as a template for both PAEs and RESEXs legal statutes. However, 
a careful analysis based on E. Ostrom’s design principles shows that the PAE-CM’s 
system is much less collective than expected, and also very much controlled by 
external authorities, which suggests a kind of top-down logic pretty much away 
from the idea of a CPR system. This finding is useful to understand the shortcom-
ings in the actual management of the PAE but also to foresee difficulties which will 
probably arise in the management of many of the areas which have gained collec-
tive land rights or collective management statutes in the Amazon.
Indeed, the same story is currently being repeated in many places in the 
Amazon. Traditional populations massively adopted collective land rights because 
it was a very efficient shortcut in order to secure their tenure and deter urgent 
external pressures. But in many cases, the recognition of their territories is a not a 
mere formalization of “traditional” collective systems. It implies on the contrary 
the creation of new institutions and important changes in the way the inhabitants 
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see their property rights and their property management, in a complex mixture of 
collective global rules and individual concrete options.
Recognizing that the collective statutes are new even to traditional communi-
ties and that those must pass through a learning process in order to manage them is 
probably the first step in order to tackle the current problems of plot sales, illegal 
logging, fishing or deforestation for cattle ranching which appear in many of those 
areas. Such a process is likely to result in the creation of new local rules, and the 
capacity of the federal agencies in charge of those areas to recognize those will 
be an important test for the possibility of the current statutes to be transformed in 
effective and functional CPR systems.
Such findings do not disqualify the PAE or RESEX as useful devices for envi-
ronmental protection (deforestation, for instance, is very limited in the PAE-CM), 
but calls for new forms of management from the authorities and new positioning 
by those and support NGOs in order for them to be fully efficient. On a theoreti-
cal point of view, this would probably correspond to the effective application of 
design principle n°8, about nested governance, by a horizontal dialogue between 
communities and authorities at different levels.
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